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DISTINCTIVE	DURESS	Craig	K.	Agule	
	In	both	law	and	morality,	duress	serves	as	a	defense.	The	bank	teller	who	provides	an	armed	robber	with	the	bank	vault	combination,	the	innocent	suspect	who	fabricates	a	story	after	hours	of	interrogation,	the	Good	Samaritan	who	breaks	into	a	private	cabin	in	the	woods	to	save	a	stranded	hiker,	and	the	father	who	drives	at	high	speed	to	rush	his	injured	child	to	the	hospital	--	in	deciding	whether	and	to	what	extent	to	blame	or	punish	agents	like	these,	we	should	take	into	account	that	they	have	acted	under	duress.	In	some	cases,	duress	functions	as	an	ordinary	justification:		the	circumstances	justify	or	permit	behavior	that	was	prima	facie	impermissible.	In	other	cases,	duress	functions	as	an	ordinary	excuse:		the	circumstances	interfere	with	the	agent’s	opportunity	to	respond	to	the	moral	or	legal	reasons	at	issue.	On	common	understandings	of	duress,	duress	always	instantiates	one	or	the	other	of	two	ordinary	defenses.	In	this	paper,	I	offer	a	new	duress	defense,	which	I	call	“distinctive	duress.”	My	argument	proceeds	as	follows.	In	Section	One,	I	make	the	case	that	good	agency	will	involve	contoured	normative	sensitivities.	In	Section	Two,	I	claim	that	those	contoured	normative	sensitivities	will	predictably	lead	to	special	cases	of	wrongdoing,	cases	which	mark	a	particular	and	central	sort	of	duress	case.	In	Section	Three,	I	consider	the	defenses	of	ordinary	justification	and	ordinary	excuse,	showing	how	neither	ordinary	defense	comfortably	explains	the	special	cases	of	wrongdoing.	In	Section	Four,	I	offer	my	account	of	distinctive	duress,	explaining	why	and	how	we	should	nonetheless	grant	these	agents	a	defense	for	acting	under	duress.	1.	 Contoured	Normative	Sensitivities	Many	arguments	about	the	appropriate	conditions	of	blame	and	punishment	proceed	from	casuistry,	a	vignette	prompting	an	intuition	that	only	the	new	contender	theory	can	handle.	My	argument	proceeds	otherwise.	I	contend	instead	that	a	plausible	way	of	thinking	about	good	normative	psychology	points	us	to	a	case	of	a	specific	structure,	a	structure	that	prompts	us	to	revisit	how	we	think	about	duress.	In	this	first	section,	I	offer	that	way	of	thinking	about	good	normative	psychology.	Good	agents	are	sensitive	to	normative	reasons.	Good	moral	agents	are	able	to	properly	perceive	and	react	to	moral	reasons,	and	good	legal	agents	are	able	to	properly	perceive	and	react	to	legal	reasons.	Thus,	the	capacities	familiar	from	the	reasons-responsiveness	literature--reasons	receptivity	and	reasons	reactivity,	to	borrow	terminology	from	John	Martin	Fischer	and	Mark	Ravizza	(1998)--are	capacities	we	should	want	to	have	and	capacities	we	should	want	others	to	have.1	Possessing	these	capacities	is	not	sufficient	for	an	agent	to	successfully	act	well:		it	is	widely	accepted	within	the	compatibilist,	moral	responsibility	literature	that	an	agent	with	these	capacities	could	be	responsible	for	doing	wrong.	However,	the	normative	capacities	are	necessary	for	good	agency,	at	least	robustly	good	agency.	An	agent’s	capacities	need	not	be	uniformly	sensitive	to	be	good	or	sufficient.	Instead,	we	should	expect	good	agents	to	have	contoured	normative	sensitivity.	That	is,	we		1	For	more	on	the	nature	and	metaphysics	of	the	capacities	at	issue,	see	the	compatibilist,	reasons-responsiveness	literature,	especially	Fischer	and	Ravizza	(1998),	Manuel	Vargas	(2013),	and	R.	Jay	Wallace	(1994).	
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should	expect	good	agents	to	be	comparatively	more	sensitive	to	some	reasons	and	comparatively	less	sensitive	to	others.2	An	agent	is	comparatively	more	sensitive	to	one	reason	rather	than	another	when	the	agent	more	readily	notices,	understands,	or	comports	his	behavior	to	the	one	reason	than	the	other,	beyond	those	differences	which	can	be	explained	by	matters	external	to	the	agent’s	moral	psychology	(e.g.,	the	weight	of	the	reasons).	For	example,	a	good	agent	might	be	more	sensitive	to	her	friends’	concerns	than	to	strangers’	similar	concerns.	This	means	more	than	that	the	good	agent	places	particular	value	on	her	friends’	concerns,	such	that	for	her	their	concerns	outweigh	the	similar	concerns	of	strangers.	The	comparative	sensitivity	claim	holds	that,	even	if	the	friends’	interests	and	the	strangers’	interests	were	equally	valuable	given	the	agent’s	values,	the	good	agent	is	more	likely	to	notice	that	her	friends’	interests	are	at	stake,	more	likely	to	perceive	the	significance	of	those	interests,	and	more	likely	to	comport	her	will	to	those	interests.		We	should	want	contoured	normative	sensitivity	in	good	agents	because	we	should	want	good	agents’	normative	capacities	to	be	specialized.	We	are	finite,	limited	beings.	We	have	limited	attention,	limited	cognitive	power,	and	limited	volitional	power.3	Because	these	limited	resources	are	needed	for	responding	to	reasons,	we	should	expect	our	normative	performance	to	be	imperfect.	We	should	expect	that	even	good	agents	will	sometimes	overlook	relevant	matters,	will	sometimes	misapprehend	the	significance	of	relevant	matters,	and	will	sometimes	act	akratically.	Given	our	finite,	imperfect	natures,	it	is	plausible	that	we	will	do	better	on	the	whole	comporting	our	behavior	to	our	values	if	our	normative	capacities	are	specialized.	Some	relevant	matters	present	themselves	more	often	than	others.	For	example,	those	of	us	living	in	largely	secular	Western	cities	are	confronted	many	times	a	day	with	the	demands	of	complicated	social	coordination	with	proximate	strangers,	whereas	we	are	rarely	confronted	with	issues	having	to	do	with	religious	hierarchies.	And	we	have	much	more	influence	on	the	resolution	of	some	matters	than	on	the	resolution	of	other	matters.	There	is	much	I	can	do	when	a	close	friend	needs	comfort	and	reassurance,	and	there	is	far	less	effect	I	can	have	when	I	learn	that	a	distant	stranger	is	in	the	same	position.	Finally,	the	stakes	are	much	higher	for	some	matters	than	for	others.	Although	the	resolution	of	local		2	For	the	most	part,	reasons-responsiveness	theorists	have	not	taken	up	the	question	of	the	patterns	in	reasons-responsiveness	we	might	find	in	agents’	moral	psychologies.	The	notable	exception	is	Fischer	and	Ravizza,	who	argue	that	an	agent’s	reasons-receptivity	must	display	an	“understandable”	pattern	of	perception	of	reasons	(1998,	p.	75).	Thus,	Fischer	and	Ravizza	leave	it	open	for	the	agent	to	be	more	perceptive	of	some	reasons	than	others	(within	the	limits	of	understandability).	However,	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	understandability-pattern	requirement	is	better	understood	as	an	evidentiary	condition	on	imputing	reasons-receptivity	than	a	metaphysical	condition	on	possessing	reasons-receptivity,	and	so,	even	for	them,	the	question	of	patterns	in	reasons-responsiveness	is	not	directly	at	issue.	3	Here,	I	mean	to	apply	the	armchair	claim	that	finite	beings’	powers	are	finite	to	the	moral	psychology	claim	that	volitional	power	is	one	sort	of	agential	power	possessed	by	finite	beings.	I	do	not	mean	to	rely	upon	any	particular	contemporary	empirical	psychological	results,	e.g.,	the	literature	on	willpower	as	a	depletable	resource.	
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discussions	about	street	lighting	is	not	trivial,	surely	the	resolution	of	neighborhood	local	about	poverty	and	crime	is	of	more	importance.	Because	of	these	disparities	in	the	regularity,	tractability,	and	importance	of	the	issues	we	face,	specialization	in	our	normative	faculties	will	help	us	to	live	lives	which	better	conform	to	our	values	and	goals.	An	agent	who	is	equally	good	at	receiving	and	reacting	to	all	reasons	will	plausibly	be	too	sensitive	to	some	reasons,	dedicating	precious	psychological	resources	to	matters	that	will	rarely,	if	ever,	be	of	importance	to	that	agent.	By	contrast,	an	agent	who	is	especially	sensitive	to	regular,	tractable,	and	important	matters	will	get	those	matters	right	more	often.	A	specialized	agent	will	do	better	in	the	ways	that	matter	than	a	uniformly	sensitive	agent	will.	The	nature	and	the	development	of	such	normative	specialization	is	an	empirical	matter,	of	course,	but	even	from	the	armchair	we	can	appreciate	that	we	should	desire	such	specialized	agency.	We	find	powerful	evidence	that	specialization	is	an	important	element	of	good	normative	psychology	in	familiar	roles	like	those	of	friend,	parent,	and	sibling.4	We	have	but	a	thin	sense	of	these	rich	roles	if	we	explain	them	wholly	in	terms	of	norms	of	external	treatment	or	in	terms	of	agent-relative	reasons.	To	fully	understand	these	roles,	we	need	to	appreciate	that	they	involve	heightened	sensitivities.	Consider	friendship.	It	is	true	that	there	are	behaviors	that	mark	friendships:		social	behaviors,	helping	behaviors,	and	the	like.	But	someone	who	merely	does	these	things	is	at	best	a	superficial	friend.	And	it	is	also	plausible	that	friendship	involves	agent-relative	reasons	privileging	one’s	friends	over	strangers:		as	between	one’s	friend	and	a	stranger,	the	friend	should	favor	the	friend.	That	gets	closer	to	what	it	is	to	be	a	friend,	but	it	is	still	too	thin	a	description.	What	marks	true	friendship	is	the	immediacy	of	the	importance	of	the	friend.5	A	good	friend	will	notice	and	appreciate	that	you	are	hurting	before	others	do,	and	a	good	friend	will	find	your	pain	motivating	more	than	others	will.	This	is	a	kind	of	specialization:		the	moral	psychology	of	a	friend	involves	a	heightened	sensitivity	to	the	interests	of	friends.	Friendship	is	not	unique	in	this	regard:		attention,	appreciation,	and	motivation	are	important	for	understanding	most	(and	maybe	virtually	all)	of	the	roles	most	important	to	our	lives.	We	can	also	find	powerful	evidence	that	specialization	is	an	important	element	of	good	normative	psychology	in	the	working	of	the	emotions.	Emotions	guide	our	attentions,	mark	value	and	disvalue	in	the	world,	and	motivate	us.6	For	instance,	when	we	are	angry	with	someone,	we	are	disposed	to	notice	their	flaws,	the	harms	they	have	caused,	their	ill	will,	and	the	like,	we	are	disposed	to	see	them	as	having	done	wrong	and	caused	harm,	and	we	are	disposed	to	exclude	and	punish	them.	The	emotions	are	also	focused,	directing	attention,	understanding,	and	motivation.	Therefore,	a	person	experiencing	an	emotion	has	contoured	normative	sensitivity.	Such	contours	are	real	even	if	episodic.	Of	course,	being	in	the	grips	of	an	emotion	can	lead	one	awry;	too	much	anger	is	a	bad	thing.	But	insofar	as	the		4	For	two	recent	arguments	that	a	good	friend’s	view	of	things	is	colored	by	her	friendship,	see	Simon	Keller	(2004)	and	Sarah	Stroud	(2006).	5	That	these	roles	are	marked	by	dispositions	that	in	part	come	before	moral	deliberation	is	one	way	to	make	good	Bernard	Williams’s	famous	“one	thought	too	many”	objection	in	his	(1981).		6	For	a	thorough	discussion	of	these	agential	roles	for	the	emotions,	see	Christine	Tappolet	(2016).	
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ordinary	emotions	are	a	good	part	of	our	ordinary	lives,	it	is	in	significant	part	because	they	ground	productive	normative	contours.	Finally,	that	our	moral	sensitivities	are	specialized	is	consistent	with	what	we	see	in	our	other	sensitivities.	For	instance,	epistemic	and	reasoning	heuristics	are	specialized	responses	to	our	finite	evidence	and	reasoning	capacities.7	Consider	the	anchoring	effect,	a	heuristic	by	which	we	are	particularly	sensitive	to	initial	reference	points.	The	anchoring	effect	can	explain	why	sales	are	so	effective:		we	find	it	very	difficult	to	ignore	the	higher	ordinary	price	in	our	estimate	of	the	value	of	the	good.	It	is	true	that	the	anchoring	effect	can	lead	us	to	make	apparent	mistakes.	However,	heuristics	are	an	economical	response	to	finite	evidence	and	finite	cognitive	power,	and	in	ordinary	cases	we	can	hope	that	they	get	us	better	judgments	at	lower	costs	than	alternative	strategies.	The	anchoring	effect	provides	a	cheap	way	to	develop	useful	estimates:		anchoring	can	be	“a	reasonable	compromise	between	error	in	judgment	and	the	cost	of	computation”	(Lieder,	Griffiths,	Huys,	&	Goodman,	2018).	As	with	contoured	normative	sensitivity,	epistemic	and	reasoning	heuristics	are	an	example	of	the	specialized	deployment	of	agential	resources	addressing	our	finite	situations.	Let	me	be	clear	about	what	I’m	claiming	here.	Contoured	normative	sensitivity	will	help	us	achieve	our	normative	goals,	contoured	normative	sensitivity	marks	many	important	human	roles	as	well	as	many	valuable	emotions,	and	contoured	normative	sensitivity	echoes	other	familiar	contoured	sensitivities.	However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	any	one	contour	is	the	best	contour.	That	might	be	the	case,	but	more	likely	there	are	many	productive,	good	contours,	as	there	are	many	ways	of	being	a	good,	productive	agent.	Relatedly,	any	particular	good	agent	will	likely	have	a	normative	psychology	that	is	both	fluid	and	mixed,	reflecting	not	just	any	one	role	or	one	emotion,	but	rather,	a	complex	set	of	dispositions	marking	a	complex	life.	Next,	that	we	should	recognize	that	contoured	normative	sensitivity	is	often	good	is	also	not	to	say	that	a	non-specialized	agent	is	a	bad	agent.	Just	as	there	are	likely	many	good	manners	of	specialization,	it	might	be	that	being	an	evenly	sensitive	agent	has	significant	advantages.	Finally,	I	am	here	claiming	that	contoured	normative	sensitivity	marks	good	agency.	This	is	a	claim	about	virtue	and	the	good,	not	a	claim	about	the	right.	There	are	further	substantive	arguments	needed	to	connect	the	former	to	the	latter.	2.	 Cases	in	the	Shadows	We	should	expect	contoured	sensitivities	to	lead	us	well	in	many	cases.	Being	a	good	friend	entails	being	especially	sensitive	to	the	reasons	having	to	do	with	one’s	friends,	and	this	will	ordinarily	lead	to	a	good	friend	being	more	likely	to	notice	when	those	reasons	are	at	stake.	In	a	characteristic	case,	this	heightened	sensitivity	is	part	of	the	explanation	of	why	a	good	friend	notices	a	subtle	need	and	responds	to	it.	The	contoured	sensitivity	leads	the	good	friend	to	notice,	appreciate,	and	react	to	a	reason	that	he	was	otherwise	comparably	more	likely	to	miss,	underappreciate,	or	fail	to	act	upon.	But	we	should	also	expect	contoured	sensitivities	to	lead	us	awry	in	some	cases.	Of	course,	being	imperfect	agents,	even	uniform	sensitivities	will	sometimes	fail	us,	as	might	be	the	case	when	morality’s	demands	are	especially	high	or	especially	unclear.	But	we	should	expect	contoured	sensitivities	to	lead	to	particular	failures	because	contoured	sensitivities	will	leave	some	reasons	in	the	shadows,	as	I	now	explain.		7	A	classic	text	here	is	Amos	Tversky	and	Daniel	Kahneman	(1974).		
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Contoured	sensitivities	will	yield	important	comparative	insensitivities.	There	are	two	senses	of	comparative	insensitivity	I	am	concerned	with.	First,	insofar	as	the	contours	are	grounded	by	the	deployment	of	finite	resources,	that	greater	resources	are	dedicated	to	the	reasons	in	the	contours	of	heightened	sensitivity	entails	that	comparably	fewer	resources	will	be	dedicated	to	the	complements	of	those	contours,	in	two	senses.	Fewer	resources	will	be	dedicated	to	the	complements	of	the	contours	than	to	the	heightened	regions	of	the	contours,	and	fewer	resources	will	be	dedicated	to	the	complements	of	the	contours	than	would	be	dedicated	to	those	complements	were	resources	distributed	evenly.	Accordingly,	we	should	not	be	surprised	to	discover	that	well-ordered	moral	agents	are	comparably	insensitive	to	rare,	distant,	or	low-stakes	matters,	even	considering	their	comparatively	low	importance.	Second,	as	virtually	all	interesting	cases	involve	a	number	of	relevant	factors,	if	a	particular	case	involves	both	relevant	factors	in	the	regions	of	heightened	sensitivity	and	other	relevant	factors,	we	should	expect	that	the	agent’s	heightened	sensitivity	to	some	factors	will	render	the	agent	comparatively	insensitive	to	the	remaining	factors.	If	the	agent	is	attending	to	the	one	factor,	that	attention	will	occlude	the	agent’s	capacity	to	attend	to	the	others;	likewise	for	the	agent’s	capacity	to	be	motivated.	Accordingly,	in	both	sorts	of	cases,	the	agent	is	disposed	to	overlook,	misperceive,	or	fail	to	be	motivated	by	some	relevant	factor.	That	is,	given	the	agent’s	contoured	normative	psychologies,	the	agent	is	more	likely	to	fail	to	respond	to	some	relevant	factor.		That	an	agent	is	disposed	to	fail	to	respond	to	an	important	moral	factor	does	not	mean	that	the	agent	will	thus	act	wrongly.	First,	despite	the	disposition,	the	agent	might	nonetheless	respond	to	the	factor	at	issue.	That	the	agent	is	disposed	to	respond	to	some	reason	is	no	guarantee	that	the	agent	in	fact	responds,	and	that	the	agent	is	disposed	not	to	respond	to	some	reason	is	likewise	no	guarantee	that	the	agent	will	in	fact	fail	to	respond.	Second,	even	if	the	agent	fails	to	respond	to	some	morally	relevant	factor,	that	factor	may	not	be	dispositive.	That	factor	might	be	countervailed	or	outweighed	in	the	particular	case.	For	instance,	suppose	that	supporting	a	friend	requires	you	to	fall	short	on	some	workplace	obligation.	Perhaps	your	friend	is	in	dire	need	of	comforting	on	the	same	evening	that	a	minor	work	project	is	due.	If	you	are	a	good	friend,	you	might	attend	to	your	friend	without	thinking	of	or	appreciating	the	potential	importance	of	the	work	project.	As	it	turns	out,	your	friend’s	interests	in	fact	outweigh	the	importance	of	the	minor	work	project.	You	failed	to	consider	the	work	project;	however,	this	did	not	lead	you	to	act	other	than	as	you	should	have	acted,	all	reasons	considered.	However,	we	should	expect	there	to	be	some	cases	where,	because	the	agent	is	disposed	to	overlook,	misperceive,	or	fail	to	be	motivated	by	some	relevant	factor,	the	agent	ends	up	acting	contrary	to	the	balance	of	reasons.	Call	these	cases	“cases	in	the	shadows.”	Cases	in	the	shadows	have	three	central	properties:		1)	the	agent’s	contoured	normative	sensitivity	disposes	the	agent	to	fail	to	respond	to	a	relevant	moral	factor	(that	is,	there	is	a	relevant	factor	in	the	shadows	cast	by	the	agent’s	heightened	sensitivity	to	other	factors),	2)	that	moral	factor	is	dispositive	with	regard	to	what	should	be	done	in	the	case,	3)	the	agent	in	fact	fails	to	respond	to	the	relevant	moral	factor,	leading	them	to	act	wrongly.8	 	8	What	is	central	to	my	broader	argument	about	duress	is	the	proposition	that	good	agency	will,	in	some	predictable	pattern	of	cases,	lead	agents	to	make	normative	mistakes.	
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Whether	any	particular	case	is	a	case	in	the	shadows	will	always	be	controversial.	We	never	have	a	complete	grasp	of	the	facts	of	any	case,	and	we	are	always	forced	to	fill	in	some	gaps	by	supposition.	The	weight	of	the	relevant	normative	factors	will	often	be	a	matter	of	judgment.	Which	facts	are	normatively	relevant,	which	direction	those	facts	tell,	how	weighty	those	facts	are,	and	how	those	facts	interact	are	all	matters	for	a	first-order	normative	theory.	Because	first-order	normative	theories	are	themselves	controversial,	whether	any	particular	agent	acts	in	accord	with	the	correct	first-order	normative	theory	will	itself	be	controversial.	However,	so	long	as	we	accept	that	good	agents	will	have	contoured	normative	dispositions,	we	should	accept	that	there	are	cases	in	the	shadows,	even	if	we	might	also	expect	identifying	them	to	be	controversial.	I	now	offer	two	cases	in	the	shadows.	In	each	case,	the	agent	acts	on	their	family’s	interests,	and	so	we	should	expect	contoured	normative	sensitivities	in	both	cases.	Because	both	the	relevant	facts	and	the	correct	first-order	theories	are	controversial,	whether	these	will	be	cases	in	the	shadows	will	also	be	controversial.	Nonetheless,	they	are	hopefully	illustrative.	Consider	Abra	first:		Abra,	a	good	mother,	lives	with	her	children	in	a	country	which,	though	it	is	relatively	stable	and	peaceful,	is	bereft	of	significant	economic	opportunities.	She	must	prepare	paperwork	to	join	a	long	queue	to	emigrate	to	a	country	with	much	richer	prospects	for	her	children.	She	realizes	that	she	can	move	to	the	front	of	the	queue	by	submitting	fraudulent	paperwork.	She	carefully	considers	this	possibility,	making	a	list	of	pros	and	cons	and	deliberating	over	the	course	of	several	weeks.	She	decides	to	submit	fraudulent	paperwork	and	does	so,	with	the	expected	result.	She	and	her	children	are	granted	visas	long	before	other	families	languishing	on	the	queue,	and	her	children	are	given	and	take	advantage	of	substantial	opportunities	for	educational,	cultural,	and	financial	enrichment.	Abra	plausibly	has	a	heightened	sensitivity	to	her	children’s	interests,	that	being	largely	constitutive	of	being	a	good	parent.	Abra’s	heightened	sensitivity	to	her	children’s	interests	leads	her	to	attend	more	closely	to	those	interests,	and	that	in	turn	leads	her	to	overlook,	fail	to	fully	appreciate,	or	fail	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	interests	of	the	others	on	the	queue,	interests	which	compete	with	her	children’s	interests.	However,	because	the	stakes	are	no	different	for	Abra	and	her	children	than	for	many	other	families	and	children	on	the	queue,	the	balance	of	relevant	reasons	tells	against	Abra’s	commission	of	fraud.9		Contoured	normative	sensitivity	is	but	one	of	several	plausible	ways	to	make	good	that	proposition.	For	example,	Gideon	Rosen	(2014)	offers	a	similar	account	of	duress	stemming	from	the	connection	between	morally	acceptable	agency	and	making	normative	mistakes.	Rosen	claims	that	the	level	of	moral	commitment	we	require	of	each	other	(basic	moral	decency)	is	less-than-perfect	moral	commitment	(full	moral	decency).	Because	we	do	not	expect	each	other	to	be	perfectly	committed	to	morality,	an	agent	might	have	an	acceptable	moral	commitment	and	yet	do	wrong.	I	claim	that	it	is	a	good-making	feature	of	good	agency	that	leads	to	distinctive-duress	cases;	Rosen	claims	only	that	it	is	a	to-be-tolerated	feature	of	good-enough	agency	that	leads	to	duress	cases.		9	From	conversation,	some	think	that	agent-relative	reasons	license	Abra’s	behavior.	I	have	two	responses	to	this	concern.	First,	notice	that	there	are	many	other	families	on	the	queue.	Even	if	Abra	has	agent-relative	reasons	heightening	the	import	of	her	children’s	interests,	
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Consider	another	example,	that	of	Absalom:	Absalom,	a	good	father	and	a	former	amateur	boxer,	lives	with	his	young	son	in	a	city.	Absalom	works	from	home,	and	so	he	watches	for	his	son	to	return	from	school	each	day.	One	day,	as	Absalom	is	waiting,	he	sees	his	son	walk	up	to	the	door.	Before	his	son	can	enter	the	home,	however,	Absalom	sees	an	older	teenager	approach,	and	Absalom	hears	the	older	teenager	threaten	his	son,	seeking	his	son’s	bag.	Moving	quickly	to	defend	his	son,	Absalom	runs	to	the	door,	opens	it,	steps	outside,	and	punches	the	older	teenager	several	times	in	succession.	Bloodied,	the	teenager	sprawls	to	the	ground	before	running	away.	As	with	Abra,	Absalom	plausibly	has	a	heightened	sensitivity	to	his	child’s	interests,	that	being	largely	constitutive	of	being	a	good	parent.	Absalom’s	heightened	sensitivity	to	his	son’s	interests	leads	him	to	attending	closely	to	those	interests,	it	leads	him	to	be	particularly	sensitive	to	threats	to	those	interests,	and	it	leads	him	to	overlook,	fail	to	fully	appreciate,	or	fail	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	interests	of	others.	While	the	teenager’s	threat	to	Absalom’s	son	gave	Absalom	reason	to	intervene,	Absalom	failed	to	avail	himself	of	less	drastic	means	of	intervention.	As	a	former	amateur	boxer,	Absalom	is	quite	imposing,	and	his	merely	opening	the	door	would	have	scared	the	teenager	off.	Even	if	some	physical	intercession	was	necessary,	several	punches	were	not--a	shove	or	single	punch	from	a	boxer	surely	would	have	done	the	trick	(and,	had	be	considered	the	situation	more	objectively,	Absalom	would	have	realized	this).	Finally,	while	the	teenager	was	threatening	Absalom’s	child,	the	teenager	was	a	teenager,	and	thus	was	less	culpable	for	his	own	wrongdoing.	Absalom’s	behavior	was	against	the	balance	of	reasons.10		 It	is	not	clear	which	cases	are	cases	in	the	shadows,	nor	is	it	clear	how	many	cases	are	cases	in	the	shadows.	However,	if	the	argument	in	the	first	section	is	correct,	there	are	cases	in	the	shadows,	cases	like	Abra’s	and	Absalom’s.	What	should	we	say	about	such	cases?	3.	 Applying	the	Ordinary	Understandings	of	Duress	For	many	philosophers,	duress	is	a	defense	when	it	instantiates	either	of	ordinary	justification	or	ordinary	excuse.11	If	duress	always	instantiates	one	of	those	ordinary	
	those	heightened	interests	can	still	be	outweighed,	and	this	is	plausibly	such	a	case.	(I	urge	this	point	later	in	considering	whether	Abra	is	entitled	to	a	justification	defense.)	Second,	because	I	proceeded	from	a	model	of	good	normative	psychology,	rather	than	by	casuistry,	those	who	see	Abra’s	case	as	one	of	justified,	agent-relative	behavior	can	construct	their	own	examples.	As	I	explained,	exactly	which	cases	will	be	cases	in	the	shadows	will	be	controversial;	that	there	will	be	cases	in	the	shadows	should	not	be.	10	I	urge	those	readers	who	do	not	my	share	my	intuition	about	this	case	to	recall	what	I	have	about	Abra’s	case—that	the	existence	of	cases	in	the	shadows	should	not	be	controversial	even	if	the	classification	of	particular	cases	is.	11	For	examples	of	philosophers	and	lawyers	discussing	duress	as	instantiating	one,	the	other,	or	both	of	these	ordinary	defenses,	see	Brenda	Baker	(1974,	1985),	David	Brink	and	Dana	Nelkin	(2013),	Joshua	Dressler	(1999,	2009),	Carl	Elliott	(1991),	Sylvia	Rich	(2018),	and	Suzanne	Uniacke	(1989).	
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defenses,	we	need	no	new	philosophical	machinery	to	account	for	duress	defenses.12	It	certainly	is	the	case	that	circumstantial	matters	can	make	for	ordinary	justification	or	ordinary	excuse;	the	many	philosophers	who	urge	that	are	not	wrong.	As	I	argue	in	this	section,	however,	neither	ordinary	justification	nor	ordinary	excuse	applies	comfortably	to	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	Should	the	agents	in	those	cases,	agents	like	Abra	and	Absalom,	be	entitled	to	a	defense,	it	will	have	to	be	a	defense	of	another	type.	Duress	sometimes	serves	as	an	ordinary	justification	defense.	An	agent	has	an	ordinary	justification	defense	against	blame	or	punishment	when,	though	the	behavior	at	issue	is	prima	facie	wrongdoing,	the	particular	circumstances	of	the	case	are	such	that	the	behavior	is	permitted	or	even	required.	On	a	familiar	if	colloquial	way	of	thinking	of	wrongdoing,	at	least	for	the	purposes	of	the	ordinary	justification	defense,	an	action	is	wrongdoing	when	the	balance	of	evils	tells	against	the	action.	It	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	batter	another	because	the	harm	imposed	by	battery	is	a	very	weighty	evil,	and	thus	ordinarily	the	balance	of	evils	tells	against	battery.	This	makes	battery	wrongdoing,	at	least	in	ordinary	cases.	Given	this	familiar	notion	of	wrongdoing,	an	agent	has	a	justification	defense	when	the	particular	circumstances	shift	the	balance	of	evils.	As	David	Brink	and	Dana	Nelkin	write,	“If	the	balance	of	evils	is	such	that	the	evil	threatened	to	the	agent	is	worse	than	the	evil	involved	in	her	wrongdoing,	then	compliance	with	the	threat	is	justified”	(2013,	p.	302),	and	as	Sylvia	Rich	writes,	justification	is	an	appropriate	defense	in	“cases	in	which	conduct	that	is	usually	wrongful	is	rendered	correct	by	unusual	circumstances”	(2018,	p.	2).	For	example,	an	agent	might	have	a	justification	defense	to	driving	over	the	speed	limit	if	the	agent	is	driving	an	injured	child	who	needs	immediate	medical	attention.	Ordinarily,	the	risk	of	harm	posed	by	speeding	is	the	weightiest	evil	in	speeding	cases,	and	so	speeding	is	prima	facie	wrongdoing.	However,	the	risk	of	harm	posed	by	an	unattended	injury	can	outweigh	the	risk	of	harm	from	speeding.	If	so,	the	balance	of	evils	has	shifted,	and	the	agent	is	entitled	to	a	justification	defense	for	acting	under	duress.	There	is	no	shift	in	the	balance	of	evils	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	By	construction	of	the	cases,	these	agents	get	things	wrong.	They	overlook,	fail	to	appreciate,	or	fail	to	react	to	some	moral	reason	that	dispositively	tells	against	acting	as	they	do.	For	example,	it	might	be	the	case	that	Abra	took	her	visa	fraud	to	be	a	justified	way	to	protect	her	children’s	interests,	and	it	seems	plausible	both	that	the	visa	fraud	advanced	her	children’s	interests	and	that	her	children’s	interests	gave	her	significant	reason	to	act.	However,	in	this	case,	her	children’s	advancement	came	at	the	expense	of	others	on	the	visa	queue,	including	many	other	similarly	situated	children.	Because	Abra’s	case	is	a	case	in	the	shadows,	it	might	be	that	she	simply	failed	to	consider	that	her	visa	fraud	would	adversely	impact	those	others,	it	might	be	that	she	noted	those	adverse	impacts	but	failed	to	appreciate	their	significance,	or	it	might	be	that	she	appreciated	the	reasons	against	the	fraud	but	could	not	prevent	herself	from	acting	akratically.	Whatever	the	case,	because	this		12	Even	supposing	it	to	be	true	that	no	new	theoretical	machinery	is	needed	to	account	for	duress,	there	is	still	good	reason	to	recognize	a	duress	defense.	Our	ordinarily	deployed	legal	and	moral	rules	are	general,	and	duress	can	help	us	pick	out	an	important	class	of	exceptions	to	those	rules.	For	instance,	if	our	legal	rules	take	simple	forms	like	“it	is	a	crime	to	intentionally	kill	another,”	then	duress	can	help	us	pick	out	important	exceptions	to	those	rules	without	unduly	complicating	the	primary	statement	of	the	rules.	
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is	a	case	in	the	shadows,	Abra’s	response	did	not	track	the	underlying	moral	facts:	those	others’	interests	in	fact	outweighed	her	children’s	interests.	That	her	children	had	an	interest	in	better	opportunities	did	not	shift	the	balance	of	evils.	Thus,	that	her	children	had	an	interest	in	better	opportunities	did	not	ground	a	duress	defense	of	justification.	Likewise,	Absalom	correctly	understood	his	son	to	be	under	threat,	and	that	threat	rendered	permissible	some	action	to	protect	his	son.	However,	Absalom’s	response	was	disproportionate	to	that	threat.13	Because	Absalom’s	case	is	a	case	in	the	shadows,	it	might	be	that	he	over-appreciated	the	danger	his	son	was	in,	it	might	be	that	he	failed	to	consider	alternative,	tempered	interventions,	it	might	be	that	he	failed	to	appreciate	how	much	pain	and	harm	he	would	cause	to	the	teenager	by	his	repeated	blows,	it	might	be	that	he	failed	to	appreciate	that	the	teenager	was,	like	his	son,	still	a	child,	only	partially	responsible	for	his	actions,	or	it	might	be	that	he	accurately	assessed	the	circumstances	but	acted	akratically.	Whatever	the	case,	because	this	is	a	case	in	the	shadows,	Absalom’s	response	did	not	track	the	underlying	moral	facts:	a	lesser	response	was	permissible,	but	Absalom’s	actual,	violent	response	was	not.	That	his	intervention	protected	his	son’s	safety	did	not	shift	the	balance	of	evils.	Thus,	that	his	intervention	protected	his	son’s	safety	did	not	ground	a	duress	defense	of	justification.	It	might	seem	that	Abra	and	Absalom	are	entitled	to	justifications	precisely	because	they	act	as	parents.14	It	might	seem	that,	because	Abra	is	a	mother,	she	had	some	agent-relative	reason	or	permission	making	her	children’s	interests	more	morally	significant	for	her	than	the	interests	of	the	others	on	the	queue,	giving	her	a	justification.15	But	remember	that	this	is	a	case	in	the	shadows.	It	isn’t	just	that	Abra’s	children’s	interests	are	at	stake;	it	is	also	that	Abra	has	made	a	normative	error.	Even	if	her	children’s	interests	are	weightier	for	Abra	because	of	her	role,	she	has	overlooked,	failed	to	appreciate,	or	failed	to	comport	her	will	to	reasons	that	outweigh	her	children’s	interests.	And	even	if	her	children’s	interests	are	weightier	for	her,	unless	her	children’s	interests	are	infinitely	weightier,	they	can	be	outweighed	by	sufficient	competing	matters.	Alternatively,	perhaps	Abra’s	behavior	is	justified	by	direct	reference	to	her	role	as	a	mother.	Perhaps	her	behavior	is	justified	because	she	did	what	a	good	mother	would	do.	This	concern	anticipates	what	I	say	about	quasi-justification	in	the	next	section.	However,	we	should	be	skeptical	that	this	reference	to	her	role	provides	a	comfortable	ordinary	justification.	First,	notice	that	Abra	does	not	reason	from	her	role	as	a	mother.	Perhaps	on	reflection	she	might	say	that	she	should	commit	visa	fraud	because	she	is	a	mother.	However,	as	described,	she	commits	visa	fraud	because	it	advances	her	children’s	interests.	That	is,	from	her	perspective,	her	children’s	interests	are	the	relevant	justificatory	factor.16	Accordingly,	even	if	we	suppose	that	Abra’s	role	justifies	her	action,	the	action	still	involves	an	important	mistake	because	Abra	is	wrong	about	what	justifies	her	action.	Second,	Abra’s	role	as	mother	is	not	at	stake	in	her	commission	of	visa	fraud.	Plausibly,	one	could	be	a		13	For	a	rich	discussion	about	the	limits	and	proper	understanding	of	self-defense,	see	Judith	Jarvis	Thomson	(1991)	and	Larry	Alexander	(1993).	14	The	analyses	of	Abra’s	case	that	follow	apply	mutatis	mutandis	to	Absalom’s	case.	15	For	an	argument	that	duress	should	be	thought	of	as	akin	to	agent-relative	justification,	see	Alexander	and	Kim	Ferzan	(2009).	16	As	a	referee	notes,	this	is	surely	how	Abra	should	reason.	For	her	to	reference	her	role	as	a	mother	in	her	own	reasoning	would	be	one	thought	too	many.	
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good	mother	and	yet,	perhaps	by	luck,	correctly	appreciate	the	normative	choice.	A	good	mother	might	still	wait	on	the	queue	or	seek	alternative	opportunities.	Even	if	Abra’s	wrongdoing	was	the	upshot	of	her	role,	that	does	not	mean	that	her	fulfilling	that	role	was	on	the	line.	Finally,	even	if	Abra’s	behavior	was	what	a	good	mother	would	do,	this	sort	of	virtue-ethical	reasoning	is	at	odds	with	the	balance-of-evils	reasoning	at	issue	in	ordinary	justification.	While	we	might	prefer	the	virtual-ethical	reasoning,	the	discord	should	give	us	pause.	If	duress	does	not	serve	as	an	ordinary	justification	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows,	might	it	serve	as	an	ordinary	excuse?	Many	see	excuse	as	the	complement	of	responsibility,	and	an	agent	is	responsible	when	they	have	both	robust	normative	capacities	and	a	robust	opportunity	to	exercise	them.17	Accordingly,	an	agent	is	entitled	to	an	excuse	when	either	they	lack	robust	normative	capacities	or	they	lack	the	robust	opportunity	to	exercise	those	capacities.	This	leads	many	philosophers	to	see	duress	as	instantiating	an	excuse	when	it	either	compromises	the	agent’s	normative	capacities	or	mars	the	operation	of	the	agent’s	normative	capacities.	This	understanding	of	duress-as-excuse	makes	sense	of	thinking	of	duress	as	destabilizing	the	agent’s	practical	reasoning	and	overbearing	the	agent’s	will.	Brenda	Baker	(1974)	and	Joshua	Dressler	(2009),	for	instance,	talk	of	threats	which	overwhelm	the	actor’s	will,	and	Rich	talks	of	“a	fear	so	great	that	it	supersedes	the	agent’s	usual	moral	reasoning”	(2018,	p.	3).	Antony	Duff	writes	that	an	agent	is	entitled	to	a	duress	excuse	when	the	agent	is	marked	by	“such	reasonably	strong	fear	…	that	is	apt	to	destablise--to	disturb	the	rational	deliberations	even	of	a	‘sober	person	of	reasonable	firmness’”	(2009,	p.	288).	On	this	understanding,	duress	grounds	an	excuse	because	the	agent	did	not	act	while	in	the	possession	of	ordinary,	sufficient,	non-occluded	normative	capacities.	Consider	the	secret	spiller	who	divulges	something	held	in	confidence	only	because	of	intensive,	abusive	questioning.	The	secret	spiller	would	be	entitled	to	a	duress	excuse	were	the	questioning	so	intense	that	the	secret	spiller	found	himself	unable	to	reason	clearly	about	what	he	should	do.	The	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows	are	not	entitled	to	an	excuse	on	these	grounds.	Though	their	capacities	are	contoured,	these	agents	are	responsible	agents	in	possession	of	sufficient	normative	capacities.	Responsibility	does	not	require	perfectly	sensitive,	perfectly	performing	capacities.	Such	a	high	bar	would	leave	none	of	us	responsible.	Rather,	responsibility	requires	capacities	of	some	significant,	sufficient	level.	For	instance,	Fischer	and	Ravizza	(1998)	and	Brink	and	Nelkin	(2013)	require	only	“moderate”	reasons-responsiveness.	Picking	the	right	moderate	level	is	sure	to	be	controversial,	but	many	of	the	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows	are	ordinary	agents,	filling	ordinary	roles.	Barring	significant	revision	about	our	responsibility	practices,	ordinary	agents	filling	ordinary	roles	are	responsible	agents	(or,	at	least,	that	they	are	ordinary	agents	filling	ordinary	roles	is	no	ground	for	denying	their	responsibility).	Accordingly,	we	can	defeasibly	assume	that	the	agent	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	has	sufficient	capacities.	Likewise,	we	can	defeasibly	assume	that	nothing	is	interfering	or	occluding	with	the	operation	of	those	capacities.	The	capacities	of	the	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows		17	Brink	and	Nelkin	(2013)	offer	a	clear	statement	of	this	two-component	view	of	moral	responsibility	in	their	account	of	the	fair	opportunity	to	avoid	wrongdoing.	Although	much	remains	to	be	said	about	what	counts	as	sufficient	normative	capacities	and	sufficient	opportunities,	the	fair-opportunity	view	is	an	attractive	view	of	moral	responsibility.		
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operate	exactly	as	we	should	expect	them	to	operate.	Of	course,	an	agent	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	could	lack	the	relevant	capacities	or	could	be	in	circumstances	preventing	their	capacities	from	operating,	but	the	mere	fact	of	being	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	does	not	entail	either	of	these	excusing	conditions.	The	agent	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	errs	normatively	not	because	their	capacities	fail	to	operate	correctly	nor	because	some	outside	factor	blocks	the	capacities	from	working	as	expected.	Rather,	the	agent	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	errs	normatively	because	their	sufficient	capacities	operate	as	we	expect	them	to	operate.	The	agent	in	a	case	in	the	shadows	has	sufficient,	non-occluded	capacities,	and	thus	no	ordinary	excuse	is	warranted.	This	analysis	puts	the	ordinary	normative	capacities	and	the	opportunity	to	exercise	them	at	the	heart	of	responsibility.	Accordingly,	if	excuse	is	grounded	in	something	other	than	the	absence	of	one	of	those	conditions	of	responsibility,	then	Abra	and	Absalom	might	be	entitled	to	excuses	despite	possessing	ordinary	normative	capacities	which	operate	ordinarily.18	Here	is	one	attractive	alternative	formulation	of	excuse:		an	agent	should	be	excused	if,	given	the	circumstances,	she	could	not	be	reasonably	expected	to	avoid	doing	wrong.19	Because	Abra	and	Absalom	act	on	good,	contoured	normative	capacities	and	because	those	capacities	make	it	unlikely	that	they	will	act	in	accord	with	the	balance	of	reasons,	it	is	plausible	that	we	cannot	reasonably	expect	them	to	avoid	wrongdoing.	Accordingly,	if	reasonable	expectations	mark	the	boundary	between	responsibility	and	excuse,	it	is	plausible	that	Abra	and	Absalom	are	entitled	to	an	excuse.	I	am	sympathetic	to	this	response.	There	is	an	intimate	connection	between	reasonable	expectations	and	blameworthiness.	However,	notice	that	this	is	no	longer	an	ordinary	excuse.	In	the	ordinary	case,	we	can	reasonably	expect	an	agent	to	act	in	accord	with	the	balance	of	reasons	precisely	because	the	agent	possesses	ordinary	normative	capacities	and	has	a	sufficient	opportunity	to	exercise	them.	Insofar	as	this	response	is	persuasive,	those	same	conditions	make	it	unreasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	act	in	accord	with	the	balance	of	reasons.	Thus,	even	if	this	is	to	count	as	an	excuse,	it	would	be	an	extraordinary	excuse.	(I	make	this	point	in	fuller	detail	in	the	next	section.)	Moreover,	it	would	be	condescending	to	excuse	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.20	Although	granting	an	agent	an	excuse	often	benefits	the	agent	(who	thereby	avoids	blame	or	punishment),	the	benefit	comes	with	a	cost--the	denial	of	agency.	When	the	agents	in	the	shadows	act,	their	wrongdoing	is	the	upshot	of	their	fulfilling	their	roles.	To	grant	them	an		18	The	capacities-and-opportunities	account	of	excuse	is	common	in	the	moral	responsibility	literature	and	in	the	criminal	law	literature,	as	is	explained	by	Brink	and	Nelkin	(2013).	However,	there	are	rich	alternatives,	especially	Antony	Duff	(2009)	and	John	Gardner	(2007).	19	Wallace’s	account	of	moral	responsibility	has	this	reasonable	expectation	at	its	core.	For	Wallace,	an	agent	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	respond	to	the	normative	reasons	so	long	as	the	agent	has	the	requisite	capacities	and	the	requisite	opportunity	to	act	on	those	capacities.	In	the	cases	in	the	shadows,	those	capacities	and	opportunities	are	not	sufficient	for	the	reasonable	expectation;	we	might	then	choose	reasonable	expectation	as	the	guiding	notion	of	excuse.	I	thank	a	referee	for	pushing	the	force	of	this	reasonable-expectation	account	of	excuse.	20	For	forceful	presentations	of	this	worry	about	condescension	and	insult,	see	Duff	(2015)	and	Gardner	(2007,	especially	“The	Gist	of	Excuses”).	
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excuse	in	these	cases	is	to	deny	that	their	success	in	fulfilling	those	roles	should	be	attributed	to	them.	Consider	Abra	again.	Abra	has	the	healthy,	functioning	normative	capacities	typical	of	a	good	parent.	She	has	sufficient	time	to	deliberate,	and	there	are	no	special	environmental	pressures	interfering	with	her	assessment	of	her	options.	When	she	commits	immigration	fraud,	she	does	so	with	sufficient,	unoccluded	capacities.	She	is	not	entitled	to	an	excuse.	Moreover,	giving	her	an	excuse	would	be	to	in	effect	judge	that	her	action	on	behalf	of	her	children	is	not	attributable	to	her,	i.e.,	that	her	acting	as	a	mother	in	this	case	is	not	the	manifestation	of	her	agency,	even	though	presumably	this	is	precisely	the	sort	of	action	she	is	most	concerned	with.21	In	Abra’s	case,	we	can	see	why	it	would	be	both	inaccurate	and	insulting	to	grant	an	excuse.	Likewise,	imagine	telling	Absalom	that	he	was	excused	for	defending	his	son.	Surely,	he	sees	shepherding	and	defending	his	son	as	significantly	constitutive	of	who	he	is.	When	he	defends	his	son	and	rebuffs	his	son’s	attacker,	that	behavior	goes	to	the	core	of	his	identity.	Excusing	him	for	that	behavior	would	be	to	say	to	him	that	we	do	not	take	him	to	be	responsive	to	reasons	in	the	way	that	marks	responsible	agency.	In	familiar	Strawsonian	(1962)	terms,	we	would	treat	him	like	a	patient	in	that	case,	not	like	an	agent.	Such	treatment	is	condescending,	especially	given	how	important	parents	take	their	responsibilities	with	regard	to	their	children.	Taking	stock:		Finite	agency	is	such	that	an	agent’s	contoured	normative	sensitivity	will	sometimes	dispose	the	agent	to	act	incorrectly	on	the	basis	of	ordinarily	operating	ordinary	normative	faculties.	In	some	such	cases,	the	agent	will	act	against	the	balance	of	reasons	because	of	the	distortions	created	by	the	agent’s	contoured	normative	sensitivity.	Such	cases	are	cases	in	the	shadows,	cases	like	Abra’s	and	Absalom’s.	In	those	cases,	the	ordinary	understandings	of	duress	do	not	give	us	reason	to	withhold	or	mitigate	our	blame.	The	circumstances	do	not	shift	the	balance	of	reasons,	and	the	agents’	healthy	capacities	are	operating	as	normal,	without	disruption	or	occlusion.	It	might	seem	that	these	agents	should	be	exposed	to	the	full	force	of	blame,	because	it	seems	that	these	agents	are	responsible	for	their	wrongdoing.	In	the	next	section,	however,	I	explain	why	these	agents	should	be	granted	a	distinctive-duress	defense.	4.	 The	Distinctive-Duress	Defense	We	can	find	theoretical	grounding	for	a	defense	for	the	cases	in	the	shadows	by	looking	at	both	justification	and	excuse	more	closely.	Each	of	these	defenses	is	associated	with	co-occurring	properties,	properties	that	come	apart	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	Teasing	apart	those	properties,	we	see	that	the	cases	in	the	shadows	are	cases	of	quasi-justification	and	of	quasi-excuse	(quasi	in	each	case	because	they	instantiate	one	but	not	all	of	the	ordinarily	co-occurring	properties),	two	defenses	which	together	comprise	the	defense	of	distinctive	duress.	Begin	with	quasi-justification.	In	paradigmatic	cases	of	justified	action,	the	agent	does	what	is	either	called	for	or	permitted	by	the	balance	of	reasons	because	of	the	proper	functioning	of	the	agent’s	good	normative	psychology.	That	is,	in	the	paradigmatic	cases,	the	functioning	of	the	agent’s	good	normative	psychology	makes	it	so	that	the	agent	perceives	and	correctly	judges	the	applicable	reasons	and	acts	in	accordance	with	her	accurate	perception.	Accordingly,	there	are	two	co-occurring	properties	in	paradigmatic		21	I	am	thinking	here	of	the	attributability	sense	of	responsibility	picked	out	by	Gary	Watson	(1996).	
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cases	of	justified	action:		the	action	is	called	for	or	permitted	by	the	balance	of	reasons,	and	the	action	is	the	upshot	of	the	proper	functioning	of	good	normative	psychology.	But	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows,	those	two	properties	no	longer	coincide.	In	such	cases,	the	action	is	the	upshot	of	the	proper	functioning	of	good	normative	psychology,	but	the	action	is	not	called	for	or	permitted	by	the	balance	of	reasons.	The	former	property	is	shared	with	cases	of	paradigmatic	justification,	but	the	latter	is	not.	This	divergence	is	not	accidental.	In	the	cases	in	the	shadows,	the	proper	functioning	of	a	good	normative	psychology	is	what	leads	someone	to	act	against	the	balance	of	reasons.	Because	Abra	is	a	good	mother,	she	is	highly	sensitive	to	her	own	children’s	interests.	This	leads	her	to	be	comparably	insensitive	to	others’	interests,	leading	her	to	act	contrary	to	the	balance	of	reasons.	Because	the	cases	in	the	shadows	share	one	important	property	with	cases	of	paradigmatic	justification	but	not	both,	they	are	cases	of	“quasi-justification.”	Because	agents	in	these	cases	act	against	the	balance	of	reasons,	their	behavior	does	not	warrant	an	ordinary	justification.	However,	their	behavior	is	the	product	of	good	normative	psychology,	and	so	in	a	significant	sense,	this	behavior	is	the	behavior	we	should	want	from	agents.	We	want	agents	to	have	and	act	upon	good	normative	psychology.	We	want	fathers	to	act	like	good	fathers,	and	good	fathers	will	often	act	like	Absalom	acts.	Accordingly,	we	should	extend	a	quasi-justification	defense	to	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	What	of	quasi-excuse?	In	paradigmatic	cases	of	excused	wrongdoing,	because	the	agent	either	lacks	ordinary	and	robust	normative	capacities	or	those	capacities	are	occluded	or	disrupted,	it	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	respond	appropriately	to	the	reasons	at	issue.22	Accordingly,	we	get	two	co-occurring	properties	in	excused	action:		first,	that	either	the	agent	lacks	ordinary,	robust	normative	capacities	or	those	capacities	are	occluded	or	disrupted	and,	second,	that	it	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	respond	to	the	reasons	at	issue.	But	these	two	properties	diverge	in	cases	in	the	shadows.	In	those	cases,	the	agent’s	ordinarily	sufficient	normative	capacities	are	operating	without	occlusion	or	interruption.	However,	because	the	agent’s	good	capacities	are	comparatively	insensitive	to	the	reasons	at	issue,	it	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	respond	to	the	reasons	at	issue.	The	one	property	is	shared	with	cases	of	paradigmatic	excuse,	but	not	the	other.	This	divergence	too	is	not	accidental.	It	is	because	the	agent’s	ordinarily	sufficient	normative	capacities	are	operating	without	occlusion	or	interruption	that	it	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	respond	to	the	reasons	at	issue.	Because	Abra’s	good	normative	psychology	leaves	her	comparatively	insensitive	to	the	interests	of	the	others	on	the	queue,	and	because	nothing	is	interfering	with	the	operation	of	Abra’s	good	normative	psychology,	it	is	not	reasonable		22	For	some	philosophers,	an	agent	is	entitled	to	an	excuse	when	his	behavior,	though	wrongdoing,	does	not	manifest	ill	will.	For	an	example	of	an	account	of	duress	given	that	understanding	of	excuse,	see	Norvin	Richards	(1987).	Accounts	of	culpability	dependent	upon	the	manifestation	of	ill	will	struggle	to	appropriately	handle	cases	of	negligence	and	cases	of	out-of-character	wrongdoing.	For	skepticism	about	the	ill-will	condition	especially	as	it	bears	on	duress,	see	Marcia	Baron	(2014)	and	Gardner	(2007,	p.	577).	Here,	I	focus	on	reasonable	expectations	and	fair	opportunities.	However,	those	who	favor	a	manifestation	account	could	either	expand	the	number	of	co-occurring	properties	in	excuse	or	replace	the	reasonable-expectation	property	with	the	manifestation	property,	the	rest	of	the	argument	proceeding	accordingly,	mutatis	mutandis.		
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for	us	to	expect	her	to	respond	to	those	interests.	It	is	unfair	of	us	to	blame	or	punish	agents	where	it	is	not	reasonable	for	us	to	expect	them	to	respond	to	the	reasons	to	act	otherwise	at	issue.	We	should	thus	extend	a	quasi-excuse	defense	to	agents	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	The	quasi-justification	and	quasi-excuse	defenses	are	connected	in	the	cases	in	the	shadows.	It	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	these	agents	to	respond	to	the	reasons	to	act	otherwise	(the	property	associated	with	excuse)	because	the	agent’s	good	moral	psychology	disposes	them	to	act	as	they	do	(the	property	associated	with	justification).	Thus,	in	this	case,	there	is	a	new	pairing	of	properties:		the	action	is	the	upshot	of	the	proper	functioning	of	a	good	normative	psychology,	and	accordingly	it	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	the	agent	to	respond	to	the	reasons	at	issue.	This	new	pairing	marks	the	distinctive-duress	defense,	a	duress	defense	which	cannot	be	accounted	for	either	by	ordinary	justification	or	ordinary	excuse.23	Here	I	face	a	classification	objection.	Why	not	think	that	the	concepts	of	justification,	excuse,	or	both	are	expansive	enough	to	include	the	distinctive-duress	cases?	For	instance,	why	not	think	that	it	is	because	Abra’s	normative	capacities	are	not	sensitive	to	the	particular	reason	at	issue	that	she	is	entitled	to	excuse,	such	that	her	case	is	just	an	ordinary	case	of	excuse?	First,	it	is	important	to	see	that	even	if	distinctive	duress	can	be	understood	as	instantiating	one	or	the	other	of	justification	or	duress,	it	will	be	as	a	distinctive	and	proper	subset	of	those	defenses.	Quasi-justification	is	in	one	important	way	like	paradigmatic	justification	and	in	one	important	way	unlike	paradigmatic	justification;	the	term	“quasi-justification”	is	intended	to	reflect	both	of	those	features.	A	similar	point	holds	for	excuse	and	quasi-excuse,	as	I	explained	previously.	Even	if	we	accept	that	the	correct	understanding	of	excuse	is	grounded	in	thinking	about	reasonable	expectations,	the	distinctive-duress	cases	will	be	distinctive	excuses	because	the	distinctive-duress	cases	will	involve	ordinary	normative	capacities	operating	ordinarily.	Even	if	the	distinctive-duress	cases	can	be	fit	within	one	or	the	other	of	the	ordinary	defenses,	the	cases	will	form	a	proper	subset	of	those	ordinary	defenses	in	light	of	the	properties	which	remain	unshared.		Second,	while	I	am	committed	to	pointing	out	the	complex	relationship	between	quasi-	and	ordinary	justification	and	quasi-	and	ordinary	excuse,	I	am	not	committed	to	any	particular	position	with	regard	to	the	boundaries	of	the	concepts	of	justification	and	excuse.	These	classificatory	and	conceptual	matters	turn	on	broader	questions	of	conceptual	ethics,	as	helpfully	discussed	by	David	Plunkett	and	Timothy	Sundell	(2013)	and	by	Plunkett	(2016).	Whether	we	want	to	call	justification	only	those	cases	that	shift	the	balance	of	evils	(the	ordinary	way	justification	is	discussed	in	the	duress	literature),	or		23	For	similar	arguments	seeing	duress	as	grounded	in	how	good	agency	and	acting	in	accord	with	moral	reasons	can	come	apart,	see	Craig	Carr	(1991),	Duff	(2015),	Gardner	(2009),	and	Michael	Gorr	(2000).	For	each	of	these	philosophers,	as	for	me,	duress	cases	involve	non-justified	action	that	can	be	explained	by	reference	to	non-culpable	features	of	the	actor’s	agency.	For	example,	for	Duff	and	Gardner,	duress	is	a	defense	where,	while	the	action	is	not	justified,	it	is	the	product	of	a	non-pathological,	reasonable	emotion.	My	account	is	distinct	from	these	other	accounts	in	the	role	played	by	contoured	normative	capacities.	The	contoured	capacities	provide	a	distinctive	explanation	for	why	the	agent	would	not	be	at	fault,	one	that	connects	to	quasi-justification	and	quasi-excuse	in	a	principled	manner.	
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whether	we	want	to	revise	our	concept	of	justification	so	as	to	include	the	duress	cases	depends	upon	the	ways	that	we	use	the	concept	of	justification,	and	thus	that	is	a	broader	question	than	my	present	concern:		showing	how	distinctive	duress	is	distinctive.	Seeing	how	these	two	pairs	of	properties	come	apart	in	cases	of	distinctive	duress	helps	to	diagnose	why	these	cases	have	been	so	difficult	to	address	for	many	philosophers.	Many	philosophers	writing	about	duress	accept	three	seemingly	plausible	propositions:		1)	culpability	is	the	product	of	responsibility	for	wrongdoing;	2)	responsibility	is	a	matter	of	having	a	properly	functioning	normative	psychology	and	the	opportunity	to	exercise	that	psychology;	and	3)	wrongdoing	is	a	matter	of	the	balance	of	reasons	bearing	on	the	action.	Because	that	trio	of	propositions	is	sensitive	to	only	one	property	from	each	of	the	co-occurring	sets	of	properties	for	justification	and	for	excuse,	it	leaves	no	way	to	comfortably	account	for	cases	of	distinctive	duress.	Instead,	philosophers	who	accept	those	three	propositions	strain	to	find	ways	to	shoehorn	the	cases	in	the	shadows	into	either	ordinary	justification	(leaning	heavily	on	agent-relative	reasons	for	example)	or	ordinary	excuse	(characterizing	duress	cases	as	cases	where	the	agent’s	psychology	interferes	with	her	reasoning,	for	example).	Only	by	recognizing	the	complex	of	properties	involved	in	both	justification	and	excuse,	and	thereby	weakening	at	least	the	latter	two	of	the	three	seemingly	plausible	propositions,	can	we	find	a	comfortable	analysis	of	the	distinctive-duress	cases.	This	account	of	distinctive	duress	helps	illuminate	the	Model	Penal	Code’s	duress	provision.24	Section	2.09(1)	reads:	It	is	an	affirmative	defense	that	the	actor	engaged	in	the	conduct	charged	to	constitute	an	offense	because	he	was	coerced	to	do	so	by	the	use	of,	or	a	threat	to	use,	unlawful	force	against	his	person	or	the	person	of	another,	that	a	person	of	reasonable	firmness	in	his	situation	would	have	been	unable	to	resist.	Subsection	4	makes	clear	that,	while	duress	is	consistent	with	justification	(which	is	described	as	a	“choice	of	evils”	defense),	duress	is	not	equivalent	to	justification.	Accordingly,	a	duress	defense	is	available	even	when	the	action	is	not	justified.	Likewise,	the	Model	Penal	Code’s	duress	defense	is	available	even	when	the	agent	is	fully	competent.	The	person	of	reasonable	firmness	is	a	competent	agent.	We	can	thus	understand	the	Model	Penal	Code’s	duress	provision	as	pointing	to	a	defense	to	culpability	available	even	in	cases	of	competent	wrongdoing.	This	is	the	spirit	of	the	distinctive-duress	defense.25	That	said,	accepting	the	distinctive-duress	defense	pushes	us	to	consider	revisions	to	the	Model	Penal	Code’s	duress	provision.	First,	I	am	skeptical	that	the	duress	defense	
	24	The	Model	Penal	Code	is	a	text	originally	prepared	in	1962	by	the	American	Law	Institute	and	revised	several	times	since	then.	Although	the	Model	Penal	Code	is	not	binding	law,	it	is	widely	regarded	both	as	capturing	important	elements	of	American	criminal	law	and	as	providing	a	productive	guide	for	modernizing	aspects	of	American	criminal	law.	25	The	Model	Penal	Code’s	duress	provision	is	plausibly	consistent	with	seeing	agents	under	duress	as	lacking	a	fair	opportunity	to	exercise	their	competence.	Insofar	as	Section	2.09(1)	is	read	in	this	fashion,	it	should	be	revised	to	accommodate	the	distinctive-duress	defense.	
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should	exclude	cases	of	natural	or	non-agential	etiology.26	The	duress	defense	has	historically	been	understood	as	limited	to	cases	where	the	pressure	causing	duress	is	brought	about	by	another	agent.	However,	none	of	the	co-occurring	factors	marking	justification	and	excuse	are	predicated	upon	the	involvement	of	some	other	agent,	and	so	I	am	skeptical	that	there	would	be	a	principled	reason	for	excluding	the	defense	in	cases	where	those	factors	are	present	for	non-agential	reasons.	Second,	given	the	possibility	that	there	are	many	good	arrangements	of	normative	psychology,	we	should	be	clear	that	the	reference	to	“a	person	of	reasonable	firmness”	is	not	pointing	to	some	unique	person	of	reasonable	firmness.	A	mother’s	reasonable	firmness	and	a	friend’s	reasonable	firmness	are	plausibly	distinctive.	Third,	the	talk	of	inability	in	the	provision	is	ambiguous.	We	should	distinguish	between	when	no	person	of	reasonable	firmness	could	possibly	resist	(which	presumably	is	true	only	in	very	few	cases)	and	when	we	cannot	reasonably	expect	a	person	of	reasonable	firmness	to	resist	(which	is	presumably	true	in	a	substantially	greater	range	of	cases).	Finally,	the	Model	Penal	Code	provision	limits	the	defense	to	cases	of	threats	of	unlawful	force.	But	many	of	the	cases	of	distinctive-duress	(at	least	as	I’ve	described	the	defense)	might	involve	matters	other	than	threats	and	certainly	will	involve	matters	other	than	unlawful	force.	Consider,	for	example,	the	pressures	bearing	on	Abra.	Even	if	we	might	have	good,	pragmatic	reason	to	limit	the	legal	defense	of	duress	to	cases	of	threats	of	unlawful	force,	we	should	consider	whether	the	moral	defense	should	be	so	sharply	constrained.	There	might	be	pragmatic	reasons	to	resist	these	revisions,	at	least	as	regards	the	criminal	law.	For	example,	if	the	duress	defense	is	predicated	upon	the	normative	contours	particular	to	different	roles,	then	juries	could	be	charged	with	sorting	out	complicated	questions	about	the	relevant	roles	at	issue	and	the	contours	implicated	by	those	roles.	There	might	be	significant	practical	concerns	about	how	such	issues	should	be	litigated	at	trial.	Moreover,	cases	of	distinctive	duress	might	be	quite	rare,	and	as	I	have	acknowledged,	whether	any	particular	case	is	a	distinctive-duress	case	will	be	controversial.	Accordingly,	while	an	ideal	duress	defense	should	be	modified	in	the	ways	I’ve	suggested,	it	might	be	that	a	duress	defense	for	our	non-ideal	criminal	justice	system	should	leave	distinctive-duress	cases	out.	Nonetheless,	because	we	should	be	concerned	not	to	deploy	the	punitive	force	of	the	criminal-justice	system	against	agents	who	are	not	culpable	wrongdoers,	the	duress	defense	we	extend	to	defendants	should	closely	track	the	ideal	duress	defense.	Courts	have	tended	to	resolve	practical	questions	about	the	duress	defense	against	defendants.	We	should	instead	accept	non-ideal	restrictions	on	the	duress	defense	only	insofar	as	we	have	great	evidence	of	their	necessity.	5.	 Conclusions	In	this	paper,	I’ve	offered	an	account	of	distinctive	duress,	a	duress	defense	not	reducible	to	ordinary	justification	or	ordinary	excuse.	An	agent	is	entitled	to	a	distinctive-duress	defense	when	their	wrongdoing	was	the	product	of	their	properly	contoured	normative	psychologies.	More	precisely,	an	agent	is	entitled	to	a	distinctive-duress	defense	when,	because	of	their	properly	contoured	normative	psychology,	they	are	comparatively	insensitive	to	the	reasons	to	do	otherwise	and	are	thereby	led	to	act	against	the	balance	of		26	For	similar	skepticism,	see	Dressler	(1999,	2009)	as	well	as	cases	like	United	States	v.	Contento-Pachon,	723	F.2d	691	(1984).	Notice	also	that	both	Abra	and	Absalom	are	reacting	to	pressures	brought	about	by	human	agency.		
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reasons.	Distinctive	duress	helps	explain	a	central	sort	of	duress	case,	the	case	of	the	good,	competent	agent	who	does	wrong	because	of	the	stakes	for	something	important	the	good,	competent	agent	cares	about.	Distinctive	duress	explains	cases	where	parents	protect	children,	where	friends	protect	friends,	where	spouses	protect	spouses,	and	the	like.	We	do	not	need	to	expand	our	accounts	of	agent-relative	justifications	to	explain	these	cases,	nor	do	we	need	to	think	that	these	agents	are	rendered	incompetent	by	their	important	involvements.	Instead,	these	central	cases	are	cases	of	distinctive	duress.	Recognizing	the	mechanisms	of	distinctive	duress	also	highlights	broader	questions	about	culpability.	First,	it	is	common	to	suggest	that	the	elements	of	culpability--responsibility	and	wrongdoing--are	independent.	But	the	distinctive-duress	defense	shows	that	the	elements	of	defense	are	not	independent.	In	distinctive	duress,	we	find	a	defense	that	implicates	elements	of	both	the	responsibility	prong	of	culpability	and	the	wrongdoing	prong	of	culpability.	This	invites	us	to	revisit	the	putative	independence	of	the	elements	of	culpability.27	Second,	thinking	about	distinctive	duress	might	point	us	to	questions	about	the	co-occurrent	properties	in	justification	and	in	excuse.	For	instance,	what	do	we	want	to	say	about	an	agent	marked	by	an	undesirable	or	vicious	normative	psychology	who,	precisely	because	of	his	vicious	normative	psychology,	thereby	reads	the	reasons	correctly	in	some	situation?	Imagine	an	agent	who	fails	to	properly	appreciate	friendship	and	who,	therefore,	is	not	attentive	by	his	putative	friends’	needs,	and	imagine	that	his	friends’	needs	are	outweighed.	The	agent	perceives	the	reasons	at	issue	and	acts	accordingly.	Thus,	the	agent	acts	in	accord	with	the	balance	of	reasons,	but	only	because	the	agent	is	marked	by	a	significant	flaw.	In	such	cases,	that	an	action	is	supported	by	the	balance	of	reasons	and	that	the	action	manifests	a	good	normative	psychology	come	apart.	How	should	we	react	to	such	agents?	Finally,	there	is	much	work	to	be	done	investigating	the	moral	implications	of	contoured	normatively	psychologies.	Almost	certainly	there	are	a	number	of	good	contours	for	our	normative	psychologies.	That	means	that	it	is	almost	certain	that	there	are	a	number	of	instantiations	of	the	distinctive-duress	defense.	As	a	matter	of	application,	do	we	need	to	identify	all	of	these	contours?	Do	we	need	to	be	sure	that	an	agent	is	contoured	in	a	fashion	that	would	ground	defense,	or	is	it	enough	that	an	agent	in	that	position	should	be	contoured	in	a	way	that	would	ground	the	distinctive-duress	defense?	We	face	questions	like	these	in	both	our	interpersonal	interaction	and	the	criminal	law.	And	the	implications	of	contoured	normative	psychologies	go	beyond	the	distinctive-duress	defense.	The	criminal	law	often	refers	to	the	reasonable	person	standard.	For	example,	the	Model	Penal	Code’s	negligence	provision	holds	agents	to	“the	standard	of	care	that	a	reasonable	person	would	observe	in	the	actor’s	situation”	(2.02(d)).	We	should	consider	how	the	reasonable-person	standard	accommodates	the	diversity	of	appropriate	normative	psychologies	picked	out	by	contoured	normative	psychologies.	The	distinctive-duress	defense	is	one	important	way	that	our	blame	and	punishment	practices	should	be	sensitive	to	the	good	contours	in	our	moral	behavior,	but	it	is	surely	just	one	of	many.28		27	For	even	more	strident	challenges	to	the	divide	between	justification	and	excuse,	see	Duff	(2009,	ch.	11)	and	Eduardo	Rivera-López	(2006).	28	This	paper	was	sparked	by	a	rich	discussion	with	Sam	Rickless	about	the	relationship	between	responsibility	for	wrongdoing	and	blameworthiness.	Thanks	also	to	audiences	at	
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